

**Address by the  
Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the  
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization**

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**2<sup>nd</sup> Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference  
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**Check Against Delivery**

I am pleased to address this second Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference. I am confident that under your able leadership, Mr. Chairman, this meeting will attain its goals.

The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) share a common history, and they are mutually reinforcing. They are bound in spirit and letter, and they are two instruments which are essential pillars for global security.

In its preamble, the NPT promised “to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time”. Progress on the CTBT “no later than 1996” was a necessary condition for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Moving the CTBT from the drawing board to the negotiating table helped to ensure that the NPT review process would continue.

Today, the CTBT represents an unprecedented achievement in the history of multilateral verification. The overwhelming majority of States support the Treaty. It has 183 States Signatories and 159 ratifying states. Since last year’s Preparatory

Committee, Niue signed the CTBT, and Brunei Darussalam, Chad and Guinea ratified it. But for the Treaty to enter into force, the ratification of the remaining 8 Annex 2 states is still required.

The power of treaties and other international agreements often resides in their symbolic importance. But the CTBT is not just a symbol. The global reach of its verification system means that the accord is firmly based in reality.

Around the globe and around the clock, almost 380 facilities of the International Monitoring System (IMS) stationed in some 90 countries are to utilize sophisticated techniques to scan the earth and the atmosphere for nuclear explosions. Around the globe and around the clock, the data are shared with 1,300 institutions in 120 countries. The verification system is more than 85% complete, and progress continues: just 10 days ago a radionuclide station in Mawson, Australia was certified bringing the number of certified stations to 275.

The Treaty's IMS has been tried and tested, reliably detecting announced nuclear tests in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2006, 2009 and most recently in February of this year. The system swiftly delivered information to the international community on the time, depth, location and magnitude of each event.

On 12 February this year, a total of 94 seismic and 2 infrasound stations detected the latest DPRK event and sent data to the International Data Centre (IDC). Magnitude is calculated on a logarithmic, rather than a linear, scale. This means that at 4.9, the 2013 event was nearly double the size of the event in 2009, which was measured at 4.5.

This meeting offers a timely opportunity to inform NPT member states that our radionuclide network has made a significant detection of radioactive noble gases that could be attributed to the announced nuclear test. The detection was made at the radionuclide station in Takasaki, Japan, located at around 1,000 kilometres from the DPRK test site. The ratio of the detected xenon isotopes is consistent with a nuclear fission event. This coincides very well with announced nuclear test by the DPRK that occurred 55 days before the measurement.

The only country to have tested nuclear weapons this millennium, the DPRK continues to undermine multilateral efforts to ban nuclear testing once and for all. The international community forcefully condemned the announced test. The message is clear: nuclear testing is poisonous for the natural environment and noxious for the political environment. Responsible members of the international community do not conduct nuclear tests.

The international community now faces a stark choice: allow such action to dictate the pace of progress on the CTBT, or regard this incident as a catalyst to achieve entry into force. This must be a unifying event for the international community. Rather than allowing for the triumph of deterministic pessimism, making way for a less stable international system, we must come together to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. The early entry into force of the CTBT is the most achievable step. We must do so without delay.

Today, there are myriad challenges facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Stalled progress on nuclear disarmament, curbing the spread of associated technologies, material and expertise, and reducing the danger of nuclear terrorism continue to loom large. Another key challenge is to resolve long running regional tensions which make nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation even more unattainable.

In the Middle East, for example, it is worth noting that both the NPT and the CTBT endorse the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. A strong NPT is fundamentally connected to progress on such a zone. The NPT, the CTBT, and NWFZs are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. This is true for both the technical and political attributes of each mechanism. In fact, a ban on nuclear weapons testing is integral to all NWFZs, and CTBT monitoring stations provide functional verification support to existing NWFZs.

Today, over 80% of countries in the Middle East are CTBT States Signatories. A significant portion of the technical groundwork for Treaty implementation is complete, with about 50% of CTBT monitoring stations in place. Furthermore, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO provides a forum for regional scientific cooperation. For instance, the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise in Jordan, which is a comprehensive simulation of the progress achieved in the design and functioning of the on-site inspection regime, promises to be a major all-encompassing event, bringing together experts from all the regional parties.

The CTBT is the ultimate confidence building measure. Needless to say, the CTBTO stands ready to contribute to the establishment of the MENWFZ.

Mr Chairman,

The CTBT was born of the optimism of the post-Cold War era, based on the understanding that stopping nuclear testing in a multilaterally verifiable manner is not naïve, but realpolitik. The majority of NPT state parties were determined to bring the CTBT into force, and we have come a long way.

Today, we must work together to recapture the multilateral spirit by which the CTBT and the NPT were realized. Rather than allowing recent events to diminish our resolve, we must work together to achieve progress. With each passing year, the sustainability of the wider non-proliferation and disarmament regime, becomes more vulnerable.

This is your Treaty, and its future is in your hands.

Thank you.